

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director, R & E

DATE: 17 January 1949

FROM : Chief, Global Survey Group *M*

SUBJECT: CIA participation in the monthly Joint Staff briefing of the Secretary of Defense.

JCS DECLASSIFY / RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

A. CHRONOLOGY

1. On 31 December the Secretary of Defense called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a monthly briefing, to be an integrated presentation of the best thought of the three Services on the military aspects of the world situation and the military implications of political and psychological developments. Mr. Forrestal noted that the Services must depend on CIA and State for information with respect to political and psychological developments. That he wished this briefing to be strictly from the military point of view, with CIA having no responsibility for the views expressed, but only to assist the JCS by supplying required information, is further indicated by the fact that he simultaneously proposed a CIA briefing of the NSC on matters outside the primary cognizance of the three Services.

2. This buck was passed by the JCS to the JIC, which on 4 January agreed that the briefing should be an integrated JIC presentation prepared by the JIG with the assistance of the Service intelligence agencies, and that the Director of Central Intelligence should be invited to assist the JIG by designation of a representative to furnish advice and information (but to have no voice in or responsibility for the military interpretation of the information provided).

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3. On the morning of 5 January [REDACTED] attended a meeting of the JIG at which it was agreed that the first draft should be prepared in five sections by five ad hoc committees each composed of four men representing the three Services and CIA.

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4. On the afternoon of 5 January and during the next day nine ranking members of ORE [REDACTED] STATINTL

[REDACTED] participated in these working subcommittees. Composition by committee is a notoriously inefficient process. It was made more so in this case by the fact that these ad hoc groups had no responsible monitors or chairmen and no preliminary draft as a basis of discussion. On this haphazard basis texts were finally evolved and submitted to Dr. Craig, whose task it was to prepare and present an integrated draft.

5. On the afternoon of 11 January ten ranking members of ORE

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(Babbitt, [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] attended a dry run before the JIG. Only the most general comment could be made on the basis of this hearing. Dr. Craig's text was not available until the conclusion of the proceedings, and then only one copy for CIA.

6. On the morning of 12 January Dr. Craig's text was reviewed in ORE and constructive proposals were prepared.

7. On the afternoon of 12 January two members of ORE (Babbitt and [REDACTED]) attended what purported to be an adjourned session of the JIG dry run to review Craig's draft. Actually, only one member of the JIG was present and the group was essentially a higher level ad hoc committee of the three Services and CIA. So far as concerned the general sections of the briefing (introduction and conclusions), this meeting struck out the text submitted by the lower ad hoc committee and adopted instead the CIA contribution submitted to that committee. In short the position with respect to those sections on the evening of 12 January was what it could as well have been on 6 January had a less cumbersome and inefficient procedure been adopted.

8. On the afternoon of 13 January there was a dry run before the JIC and the Director of Central Intelligence. Babbitt and [REDACTED] were present from ORE.

9. The presentation was finally made on the morning of 15 January. The only persons present, apart from those who had participated in the preparation of the paper and sundry secretaries and aides, were Mr. Forrestal, Gen. Bradley, Gen. Everest (for Gen. Vandenberg), Gen. Gruenther, and Gen. Lemnitzer. The Director was present, as were Babbitt and [REDACTED]

B. OBSERVATIONS


10. Except for a few military statistics, the presentation was simply a general review of the situation predominantly political in character (i.e., it was not particularly responsive to Mr. Forrestal's specifications or distinguishable from the sort of presentation to be expected of CIA before the NSC).

11. Although the presentation was supposed to be prepared by the Joint Intelligence Group, that body actually contributed nothing whatever to it, the burden devolving entirely on the Service agencies and CIA and on Dr. Craig.

12. The procedure adopted for developing the presentation was appallingly cumbersome and inefficient. CIA, in its merely contributory role, was required to put at least 165 man-hours of P-8/P-7 time into

the preparation of a 30-minute briefing. That figure should be multiplied by four to cover the contributions of the Service agencies. At a rough reckoning, each minute of briefing cost the Government 22 man-hours of preparation, not counting Dr. Craig's time.

13. The efficiency of the proceedings would be considerably enhanced if CIA could make its contribution directly to Dr. Craig for adaptation by him as a basis for comment by the Services from the military point of view.



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